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§14.1. Prejudicial inferences: Evidence of concealed weapons. The 
defendant in Commonwealth v. Haney 1 was convicted on an indict-
ment charging him with armed robbery. In December 1968, the man-
ager of a grocery store was held up by a man carrying a chrome-plated 
revolver with some distinctive rust spots on the barrel. The store manager 
identified the defendant by examining a series of pictures shown to him 
by the police. In the course of their investigation, the police searched 
the premises of a motorcycle club frequented by the defendant and 
found a .38 caliber revolver that the store manager was able to identify 
as the one used in the robbery. When police later sought to apprehend 
the defendant at the motorcycle club, he attempted unsuccessfully to 
flee in an automobile. One of the police officers stopped him at gun-
point, ordered him to put his hands on the steering wheel, and noticed 
the defendant look up at a particular spot on the car's headliner (the 
car was a convertible). Examination disclosed a pistol concealed in the 
padding of the convertible top, between the headliner and the outer 
material. Though this pistol was clearly not the one used in the holdup, 
it was offered in evidence by the Commonwealth and admitted by the 
trial judge. The defendant appealed from his subsequent armed rob-
bery conviction, contending that the gun found in the car should not, 
under the circumstances, have been admitted in evidence. It was preju-
dicial, he argued, because it invited the inference that he was a person 
of vicious and dangerous propensities. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the gun was admissible because it was germane to the testi-
mony regarding the defendant's flight, which itself could be admitted 
as evidence of consciousness of guilt. 
The defendant's appeal relied upon the rule that "weapons found in 
the possession of a defendant are admissible only if they might have 
been used in the commission of the crime charged. . . . Otherwise an 
inference that a defendant has vicious and dangerous propensities 
might be drawn that would be prejudicial to him." 2 The Supreme 
Judicial Court did not challenge this rule in Haney, but found it to be 
inapplicable in view of the defendant's attempted flight. The Court 
noted that flight from justice has been deemed an indication of con-
§14.1. 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l447,264N.E.2d654. 
2 Commonwealth v. West, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 497, 258 N.E.2d 22, 24; Common· 
wealth v. McLaughlin, 352 Mass. 218, 229-230, 224 N.E.2d 444, 451 (1967); Common-
wealth v. O'Toole, 326 Mass. 35, 39, 92 N.E.2d 618, 620 (1950). The Massachusetts cases 
do not actually state the rule as suggested by the defendant, but his phrasing of the rule 
seems to be generally accepted in other jurisdictions. See People v. Zackowitz, 254 N,Y. 
192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930). 
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sciousness of guilt. 3 By the Court's reasoning, therefore, the question 
was narrowed to whether the evidence concerning the gun found in the 
car was admissible on the issue of flight. There was testimony that the 
gun was in working order and that the defendant was carrying ammuni-
tion for the gun on his person at the time of the arrest. This evidence 
was sufficient, the Court felt, to sustain an inference that the gun was 
part of the means by which the defendant planned to realize his escape, 
and that he planned to use it to that end if necessary. Therefore, the 
gun evidence was admissible on the issue of flight. 
The doctrine that evidence of flight can be introduced as an indica-
tion of guilt has been criticized.4 One qualification of the rule that has 
been recognized in Massachusetts is that the defendant has a right to 
offer evidence tending to justify his flight. 5 In the instant case, the de-
fendant explained his flight by saying that he did not want to be found 
with a gun in his car. The ironic dilemma for the defendant was that 
his explanation itself required him to introduce the evidence he con-
sidered prejudicial. His only alternative was to waive his right to offer 
evidence in justification of his flight. 
The prosecution suggested that Haney's apparent dilemma cut two 
ways, leaving the defendant in a position to challenge the prosecution's 
conduct of the case whether the prosecution offered or withheld the 
gun evidence. 6 According to the prosecution, Haney chose one of his 
options by waiting to object until the evidence had been introduced. 
Had the evidence been withheld, on the other hand, Haney could have 
introduced it himself as an explanation for his flight or could have 
accused the prosecution of withholding evidence that served to explain 
his reasons for attempting to flee. Moreover, the prosecution argued 
that since the defendant himself admitted having the gun in the car 
during direct testimony, any error in admitting the evidence of the con-
cealed gun was thereby rendered harmless. 
Apart from Haney's particular dilemma, the case raises the issue of 
how valid it is to connect the concealed gun and the attempted flight in 
circumstances where the defendant made no attempt to use the gun to 
effect his flight. With regard to this issue, the Court cited the case of 
Commonwealth v. Mercier, which held that the means available to 
effectuate a flight are admissible in evidence even if not used. 7 Mercier 
involved an individual in jail who was found with hacksaw blades sewn 
into his trousers. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded: 
It was for the jury to say from the whole evidence whether they 
would believe the defendant's explanation of the manner in which 
the saws came into his possession and his purpose in continuing 
to keep them [namely, that he obtained them in prison and con-
3 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §276 (3ded., Supp. 1970). 
4 See discussion in Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408,412-423 ( 1896). 
5 Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 119 N .E.2d 608, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 
(1958); Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 326 Mass. 373, 94 N.E.2d 761 (1950). 
6 Brieffor the Commonwealth at 7, Commonwealth v. Haney. 
7 257 Mass. 353,368-369, 153 N.E. 834,838 ( 1926). 
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cealed them because he was afraid that if they were found, he would 
be suspected of trying to escape], or whether they would find that 
he had the saws to use in effecting an escape if opportunity pre-
sented itself.B 
The foregoing statement, if applied to the circumstances in Haney, 
would seem to support the allowance of the gun evidence, leaving the 
defendant to mitigate its harmful effect as best he could by excuse or 
explanation. However, the Court's opinion in Mercier must be weighed 
with regard for its context, namely, a prison setting that supported a 
clear inference that the saws, if entended for use at all, were intended 
to aid in an escape. In the Haney case, however, application of the 
Mercier rule seems to beg the question, which is whether the gun was 
intended for use to effect the flight. It is not certain whether defendant 
Haney, who was taken by surprise by the police, had secreted the gun 
in the car specifically for purposes of flight, or had secreted it for other 
purposes in the car he happened to have available to him when he 
determined to avoid capture. 
In approving the admission of the evidence of the concealed weapon, 
the Court was necessarily averring that the jury could have inferred the 
defendant's intention to use the gun if necessary to further his plan of 
flight. However, some Massachusetts cases seem to question the validity 
of that type of extended inference. In Atlas v. Silsbury-Gamble Motors 
Co.,9 witnesses' descriptions of a hit-and-run vehicle fitted the defen-
dant's car in every particular but failed to establish positively that the 
defendant's vehicle was in fact the one involved. Further, it was found 
that the defendant's car had a broken headlight, though it had not been 
ascertained that the hit-and-run vehicle had sustained a broken head-
light in the accident in question. Regarding the defendant's broken 
light, the Court said: "In view of the many ways in which the headlight 
might have been broken, it could not have been inferred that there was 
a greater probability that it was broken by striking the plaintiff than 
that it was broken in some other way." 10 In Smith v. Rapid Transit, 
Inc., 11 a bus forced the plaintiff's car off the traveled way and into a 
parked car. The incident occurred at 1 A.M. The defendant was the sole 
bus line licensed to travel that particular road, and it was shown that 
the place and time of the accident were consistent with one of the de-
fendant's regularly scheduled routes. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court did not permit the inference that one of the defendant's 
buses was in fact the one which forced the plaintiff off the highway; the 
Court's opinion pointed out that ownership of the bus was a matter of 
conjecture, 12 that is, the bus could have been a chartered or private 
bus. 
Considering the limitations the Supreme Judicial Court has placed 
8 I d. at 369, 153 N .E. at 838. 
9 278 Mass. 279, 180 N.E. 127 ( 1932). 
10 Id. at282, 180 N.E. at 128. 
11 317 Mass. 469, 58 N .E.2d 754 ( 1945 ). 
12 I d. at 4 70, 58 N .E.2d at 7.55. 
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upon the validity of inferences in these civil actions, should not the 
same strictness be exercised a fortiori in criminal actions like Common-
wealth v. Haney? A number of plausible hypotheses for Haney's con-
cealing a gun in his car can be advanced that are unrelated to his at-
tempt to avoid capture. If the Atlas and Smith cases suggest that it 
would be invalid to infer that Haney intended to use the gun to effect 
his escape, the rationale justifying admission of the evidence of the gun 
vanishes. 
§14.2. Prejudicial testimony: Evidence of defendant's marital status 
in prosecution for rape. The admissibility of potentially prejudicial 
evidence was at issue in the case of Commonwealth v. Libby. 1 The 
defendants were convicted of rape by a superior court jury. When de-
fendants' motion for a new trial was denied, the case was appealed to 
the Supreme Judicial Court. Among other assignments of error, it was 
alleged that the admission of evidence about the marital status of the 
defendants constituted prejudicial error. Defendants argued that such 
testimony would tend to confuse the issues and possibly give the jury 
an opportunity to punish the defendants not for rape but for marital 
infidelity. 
The Supreme Judicial Court did not agree, noting at the outset that 
although each defendant had been asked on cross-examination whether 
he was married, none of them had made a timely objection or had saved 
a proper exception. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that even had 
there been appropriate objections, it would not have been prejudicial 
error to admit the answers. According to the Court, the defendants, by 
taking the stand in their own defense, submitted to all "reasonable" 
cross-examination. "That submission ordinarily should extend at least 
to basic or routine facts concerning his background such as marital 
status."2 Admission of the "incidental testimony" about the marital 
status of the defendants was found to be harmless error, "if error at all." 
It should be noted, however, that some five months after the decision in 
Libby, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that once a defendant had 
taken the stand in his own defense, he was "open to cross-examina-
tion, at least about all matters relevant to the crime with which [he was] 
charged."3 (Emphasis added.) If the standard to be applied is one of 
relevancy, exclusion of evidence as to defendants' marital status would 
seem to be required, particularly where the evidence is not neutral and 
may indeed be prejudicial. However, the defendant should be required 
to make a timely objection when the question concerning marital status 
is first asked at trial. 
§14.2. 1 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 85, 266N.E.2d641. 
2 Id. at 88, 266 N.E.2d at 644. The Court cited decisions from three jurisdictions in 
support of this proposition. In one of the cases cited, on facts very similar to those in 
Libby, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared that "[w]hen a defendant in·a criminal 
prosecution takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined as 
fully and freely as any other witness." Hayton v. Commonwealth, 332 S.W.2d 537, 538 
(Ky. 1960). 
3 Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1181, 1184, 271 N.E.2d 633, 635, 
citing Commonwealth v. West, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495,497-498,258 N.E.2d22, 24. 
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It appears to be the general rule that evidence of a defendant's marital 
status is not admissible in a prosecution for rape, for the reason that such 
evidence is generally not relevant to the issues presented.4 In some 
cases it has even been held that admission of evidence, in rape and simi-
lar cases, that the accused is married, has children, and the like, is 
prejudicial and constitutes reversible error.5 In State v. Dorton,6 for 
example, the defendant in a rape case had objected at his trial to testi-
mony by a witness relating to the defendant's marital status. The West 
Virginia Supreme Court held that the testimony was presumptively 
prejudicial and required reversal of the conviction. The court said that 
the defendant, as a married man who had admitted his association and 
sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, would be subjected to greater 
criticism and more severe condemnation than a single man. "Proof that 
a married man has engaged in criminal intimacy with a young woman 
might tend to incite the jury to return a verdict calling for punishment 
of such an unworthy member of society."7 The West Virginia Supreme 
Court concluded that there was nothing in the case to show that the 
verdict of the jury could not have been influenced by the admission of 
the irrelevant testimony. 
When the evidence of marital status is clearly relevant, however, the 
general rule of inadmissibility would normally have to give way. For 
example, such evidence would be relevant if the defendant alleged a 
marital relationship between himself and the prosecutrix.8 Similarly, 
evidence that the accused was married to a person other than the pros-
ecutrix has been admitted for the purpose of cutting off the defense that 
the prosecutrix was the defendant's common law wife.9 In another case, 
in which the defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with 
his minor stepdaughter, his current marital status came before the jury 
because his relations with his wife were considered relevant and ma-
terial to the offense charged.'0 
§14.3. Disqualified testimony: Protection of private conversations 
between spouses. In Commonwealth v. Gillis,' the defendant was 
found guilty in superior court of assault with intent to murder. The 
victim, who was the defendant's estranged wife at the time of the alleged 
assault, testified that she had met the defendant in private to inform him 
of her plans to divorce him. Defense counsel objected to this testimony 
and to the wife's testimony that the defendant had threatened to kill her. 
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, admitted the testimony as to 
4 See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1067 (1958). 
5 People v. Zemavasky, 20 Cal. App. 2d 56, 123 P.2d 478 (1942); People v. Travis, 247 
Mich. 514,224 N.W. 329 (1929); Thompson v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 320, 327 S.W.2d 745 
(1959). 
6 125W. Va.381,24S.E.2d455(1943). 
7 Id. at385, 24 S.E.2dat457. 
8 Fieldsv. Commonwealth, 301 Ky.551, 192S.W.2d478(l946). 
9 Wilkerson v. State, 60Tex. Crim. 388, 131 S.W.ll08 (1910). 
10 Statev. Norton, 151 Me. 178, 116A.2d635 (1955). 
§14.3. 1 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l343,263N.E.2d437. 
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the threat, but excluded the rest of the conversation. Defense counsel 
saved an exception and then asked that if any portion of the conversa-
tion was to be admitted, it all be admitted. The trial judge granted the 
request. Continuing with her testimony, defendant's wife stated that 
she had informed her husband of her consultations with an attorney 
in regard to obtaining a divorce, and that defendant reacted by stating 
that "it would never happen." She further related that he approached 
her holding a large knife, saying, "I will kill you. If I can't have you 
nobody will." Mrs. Gillis told her husband to put down the knife and 
he complied. Her testimony also included details of another conver-
sation with her husband about a week after the incident described above. 
On that second occasion, he assaulted her in public, kicked in the 
house door and, when both of them were inside, stabbed her several 
times. 
The cornerstone of defendant's appeal in this case was founded on 
G.L., c. 233, §20, which provides in part: 
Any person of sufficient understanding, although a party, may 
testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a 
person who has authority to receive evidence, except as follows: 
First, Except in a proceeding arising out of or involving a con-
tract made by a married woman with her husband and except in a 
proceeding under [G.L., c. 273A)2 and in a prosecution begun 
under [G.L., c. 273, §§l-10),3 neither husband nor wife shall testify 
as to private conversations with the other. [Footnotes added.] 
Arguing that the statute was violated by the admission of his wife's 
testimony as to his statement, "I am going to kill you," defendant at-
tempted to exclude this testimony which, when coupled with other 
evidence, would permit an inference that he intended to murder his 
wife. 
The private conversation disqualification claimed by the defendant 
in the Gillis case is a salient feature of the protection afforded marital 
conversations under Massachusetts law. In many other jurisdictions, 
the rules of evidence pertaining to marital exchanges limit the scope of 
protection by conferring only a privilege, 4 but the purpose is still that 
of protecting the marital relationship and the special confidence inci-
2 G.L., c. 273A deals with uniform reciprocal enforcement of support actions. 
3 G.L., c. 273, §§ 1-10 concerns actions for desertion and nonsupport. 
• "Distinctions between the privilege not to testify against a spouse who is a criminal 
defendant (GL 233, §20, cl 2) and the disqualification to disclose private conversations 
(GL 233, §20, ell) are discussed in Com. v. Spencer, 212 Mass 438,-450-451, 99 NE 266, 
271 (1912). They are as follows: 
"(1) The disqualification applies in all actions, whether one of the spouses is a party 
or not; the privilege applies only in criminal cases where one spouse is the criminal de-
fendant. 
"(2) The disqualification affects only a very limited class of testimony; the privilege 
affects all unfavorable testimony if it applies at all. 
"(3) The disqualification is a rule of disqualification in Massachusetts; the privilege 
is a real privilege and can be waived by the witness-spouse. 
"(4) The disqualification forbids both spouses to testify; the privilege excuses only 
6
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dent to it.5 The Massachusetts statute covers only private conversa-
tions between the spouses and does not render either spouse completely 
secure from testimony by the other. In criminal actions where only one 
spouse is involved-as defendant-the other may choose, under the 
claim of privilege, not to testify against the first. 6 In civil actions, 
neither privilege nor disqualification is available; one spouse may be 
compelled to testify against the other concerning any matter other than 
private conversations.? 
The private conversation disqualification of G.L., c. 233, §20 and its 
predecessors has been irregularly defined by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. In 1859, French v. French8 set forth the premise that one spouse 
should be allowed to testify as to "abusive language" spoken by the 
other at a time when the two were not in conversation. This rationale 
may have circumvented the statute, but it suggested a semantic guess-
ing-game as to when "language" became "conversation." Exclamations 
of pain were held admissible in Commonwealth v. ]ardine,9 insofar as 
they were not "conversation" but served to prove the fact of the spouse's 
pain. In Commonwealth v. Caponi, 10 the Court refused to apply the 
disqualification to a defendant husband's letters to his wife. However, 
nonconfidential, privately held business conversations between hus-
band and wife were held to fall within the scope of the exclusion in 
Commonwealth v. Hayes.ll Commonwealth v. Wake/in limited the 
disqualification to the spouses; third parties overhearing a private 
conversation may testify as to it. 12 
The decision handed down by the Court in Gillis removes certain 
abusive conduct from the ambit of the protection provided by the con-
versation disqualification. In its initial phrasing of the issue, the Court 
appeared to limit this new exception to instances of private spousal 
conversation wherein a verbal threat is accompanied by a menacing 
act: 
We must decide whether the spontaneous threat ... in reaction 
to the wife's ... disclosure of her divorce plans, accompanied by 
the act of seizing a knife, can reasonably be regarded as a "private 
the non-party-spouse from testifying. 
"(5) The disqualification depends upon the existence of the marriage relationship at 
the time of the communication; the privilege depends upon the existence of the relation-
ship at the time of the trial." Leach and Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 
141 (4th ed. 1967). 
See also Hughes, Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series §141 (1961 ). 
5 See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 ( 1934). 
6 G.L., c. 233, §20 states in part that "neither husband nor wife shall be compelled 
to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against 
the other." (Emphasis added.) 
7 Anderson v. Edwards, 123 Mass. 273 ( 1877). 
8 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 186 (1859). 
9 143Mass.567, ION.E.250(1887). 
10 155Mass.534,30N.E.82(1892). 
11 145Mass.289, 14N.E.l51 (1887). 
12 230 Mass. 567,574, 120 N.E. 209,212 (1918). 
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conversation" rather than as essentially an act ... of abusive 
verbal assault. 13 [Emphasis added.] 
Later in its opinion, however, the Court provided a more expansive 
guideline for determining what will be excluded from the disqualifica-
tion: 
[T]he statute's purpose of protecting the marital relationship and 
encouraging spousal confidence does not logically extend to words 
constituting or accompanying abuse, threats, or assaults of which 
the other spouse is the victim. Statements, not reasonably to be re-
garded as "conversation," are not within the statutory prohibition. 
Even if induced by private conversation, such abusive or threaten-
ing words do not have any confidential aspect within the purpose 
of the protection. 14 [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, while holding on the facts before it that abusive threats uttered 
in conjunction with threatening acts will not be viewed as "private 
conversation" in Massachusetts, the Court strongly suggested that cer-
tain abusive verbal assaults will likewise be denied the benefits of dis-
qualification. 
The rationale in Gillis is consistent with a considerable body of 
authority in other jurisdictions denying protection, under either privi-
lege or disqualification, to abusive verbal threats. 15 The decision, 
however, may be predicated upon a judicial inclination to extend to 
spouses some degree of physical security comparable to that afforded 
other nonspousal parties under criminal law. In Commonwealth v. 
Retkovitz, 16 the Court ruled admissible threats of violence made about 
forty-four days prior to a homicide. Indeed, proof of a defendant's 
dangerous propensities toward a particular victim has been permitted 
by introduction of a defendant's statements made more than a year be-
fore the assault in question. 17 Although these criminal actions do not 
bear directly upon the issue of private spousal conversations, it is clear 
that threats and like evidence of intended criminal harm, as between 
spouses, may have to be founded in part upon "private conversation" 
between husband and wife. 
§14.4. Privileged communications: Patients and psychotherapists. 
Since 1968, with certain limitations, communications between patient 
and psychotherapist have been privileged under G.L., c. 233, §20B. The 
relevant parts of that section are: 
Except as hereinafter provided, in any court proceeding . . . a 
patient shall have the privilege ... of preventing a witness from 
disclosing any communication, whatever made, between said pa-
13 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1343, 1345,263 N.E.2d 437,439. 
14 Id. at 1346, 263 N.E.2d at 440. 
15 The court noted that its decision brought Massachusetts law into conformity with 
a growing body of authority in other jurisdictions. Id. at 1346 n.3, 263 N.E.2d 440 n.3. 
16 222 Mass. 245, 110 N.E. 293 (1915). 
17 Commonwealth v. Ramey, 243 Mass. 394, 137 N.E. 657 (1923). 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/17
370 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.4 
tient and a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient's mental or emotional condition .... 
The privilege granted hereunder shall not apply to any of the 
following communications:-
( e) In any childcustodycase in which either party raises the men-
tal condition of the other party as part of a claim or defense, and 
the psychotherapist believes that disclosure is necessary because 
the mental condition of the patient would seriously impair his 
ability to care for the child, and thereafter makes such disclosure 
to the judge in chamber; and the judge then determines that the 
mental or emotional condition of the patient would in fact seri-
ously impair his ability to provide suitable custody, and that it is 
more important to the interests of justice that the communication 
be disclosed than the relationship between patient and psycho-
therapist be protected. 
In Usen v. Usen, 1 the mother of a minor child appealed a probate 
court decree awarding custody of the child to the father. Her appeal was 
based in part on a claim that the testimony of her psychotherapist had 
been improperly admitted. Communications between the mother 
and her psychotherapist were disclosed by him without any prior in-
dication that he considered such disclosure necessary and without any 
prior conference wi~h the judge in chambers. The trial judge merely 
found from the psychotherapist's testimony that the mother's ability to 
provide suitable custody had in fact been seriously impaired. She argued 
that the failure to comply with the statutory requirements constituted 
reversible error. The father contended that the procedures detailed in 
the statute should be liberally construed. Thus he argued that the hear-
ing in chambers was designed to prevent unwarranted disclosure of 
the privileged communication, not to create convenient grounds for 
reversal when the disclosure in open court amply demonstrates substan-
tial impairment of the patient's ability to provide suitable care for the 
child. 2 Moreover, he contended that the psychotherapist's testimony 
did no more than repeat the hospital records and would, therefore, have 
been admissible anyway under G.L., c. 233, §79.3 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the probate court and held 
that communications between a patient and a psychotherapist are 
privileged and inadmissible at the patient's request, even if those com-
munications are part of the hospital record, unless the procedures out-
lined under the statute have been "meticulously observed. "4 The 
Court reasoned that the procedures represent a legislative acknowledg-
ment that " 'environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally im-
portant to the successful operation of psychotherapy.' "5 The Court 
§14.4. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 793,269N.E.2d442. 
2 BriefforRespondentatl3, Usenv. Usen. 
3 G.L., c. 233, §79 provides in part: "Records kept by hospitals . . . shall be admis-
sible . . . as evidence in the courts of the commonwealth. . . . " 
4 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 793, 797,269N.E.2d442,444. 
5 ld. at 7%...269 N.E.2d at 444, quoting In re Lifschultz, 2 Cal. 2d 415, 422, 467 P.2d 
9
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also found that the admission of hospital records under G.L., c. 233, §79 
has as its primary purpose the release of " 'physicians and nurses of 
public hospitals from the hardship and inconvenience of attending 
court as witnesses to facts which ordinarily would be found recorded 
in the hospital books.' "6 In the absence of a contrary legislative intent, 
the Court refused to limit the statutory privilege merely because the 
privileged communication became part of a hospital record. 
Although the Court specifically rejected the mother's argument that 
gross deviations from the statutory procedures can never constitute 
harmless error, the Usen decision does suggest that those procedures 
represent the only effective method for meeting the expectations of con-
fidentiality which are understandably held by most psychiatric patients. 
Presumably, the statutory procedures were designed to meet those ex-
pectations by placing the initial responsibility for disclosure on the 
psychotherapist himself. Insofar as a psychotherapist is not likely to 
make disclosures lightly, such a procedure ensures that confidentiality 
will be protected.7 One would think that the purposes of the statute 
could also be met by a showing that the psychotherapist voluntarily 
disclosed the communications of his patient. Nonetheless, the decision 
in Usen seems to assume a legislative judgment that a psychotherapist 
may not be sufficiently protective of his patient's interest, and that an 
independent evaluation by the judge in chambers is required. 
§14.5. Unsworn statements to the jury; Refusal of one defendant to 
answer questions exculpating another: Commonwealth v. O'Brien. 1 
Defendants O'Brien, DiMinico, McDowell, and Laughran were tried 
on indictments charging first-degree murder and armed robbery. At the 
close of evidence, a verdict of not guilty was directed for McDowell. The 
jury foundLaughran not guilty, and found O'Brien and DiMinico each 
557, 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (1970). 
6 Id. at 795, 269 N.E.2d at 444, quoting Leonard v. Boston Elev. Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 
482, 125 N.E. 593 (1920). 
7 This procedure, on the other hand, may place the psychotherapist in a rather awk-
ward position. In a sense he is charged with weighing the interests of his patient against 
those of a child to whom he has no professional obligation. Arguably, such a determina-
tion is of a judicial rather than medical nature. A 1972 Massachusetts legislative propos-
al, Senate Bill 540, would replace paragraph (e) of Section 20B with the following pro-
VISIOn: 
"(e) In any child custody case in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the judge, in the 
exercise of his discretion determines that the evidence bears significantly on the patient's 
ability to provide suitable custody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the 
child that the communication be disclosed than the relationship between patient and · 
psychotherapist be protected." 
Not only does this provision relieve the psychotherapist of responsibility, it also pro-
vides for less stringent restrictions on the evidence. Under this provision, the evidence 
will go in if it bears significantly on the patient's ability to provide suitable custody, 
whereas under the current provision the evidence is admissible only if it shows that such 
ability has been "seriously impaired." The sanctity of the psychotherapist-patient rela-
tionship could be reduced to a matter of judicial grace unless the phrase "bears signifi-
cantly" is strictly construed. 
§14.5. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1181,271 N.E.2d 633. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/17
372 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.5 
guilty of second-degree murder and armed robbery. O'Brien and Di-
Minico appealed. 
On the morning of August 5, 1969, two men identified by witnesses 
as Laughran and DiMinico entered a market and ordered the owner 
at gunpoint to place the money from the cash register in a bag. The 
two then left the store with the money. During the robbery, the owner's 
son had slipped unseen out the back of the store. As the robbers left 
through the front door, they were confronted by the son, who was 
armed with a shotgun. In an exchange of shots, the son was fatally 
wounded and DiMinico was less seriously wounded with shotgun pel-
lets. The robbers, described variously by witnesses as either two, three, 
or four men, left the scene in an automobile. One witness followed them 
to the vicinity of McDowell's apartment and phoned the police, who 
shortly thereafter arrived at the apartment and arrested O'Brien, Di-
Minico, and McDowell. After calling the police, the witness saw Laugh-
ran in the street and detained him until police arrived. 
At the trial, McDowell and Laughran testified for the Common-
wealth during its case in chief. DiMinico, testifying in his own behalf, 
admitted complicity in the robbery but emphatically denied that Laugh-
ran had accompanied him. Upon cross-examination by the prosecu-
tor, DiMinico refused to discuss O'Brien's alleged involvement in the 
affair. After·the arguments and prior to the charge, O'Brien who had 
not testified, was allowed to make an unsworn statement to the jury 
on his own behalf, pursuant to a long-standing Massachusetts custom 
in capital cases. DiMinico, who had taken the stand, was not allowed 
to make such a statement. 
DiMinico's appeal. biMinico's appeal concerned the trial judge's re-
fusal to let him make an unsworn statement to the jury. The origin of 
the custom of permitting the unsworn statement apparently derives 
from the .time when a defendant in a criminal action was deemed in-
competent to testify in his own behalf and was not allowed the assis-
tance of counsel.2 The unsworn statement was designed as a stopgap 
measure to mitigate whatever harshness resulted from the competency 
rule.3 The immediate justification for the unsworn statement in Mas-
sachusetts, in light of similar incompetency considerations, was Article 
12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, 
which enables every accused in a criminal prosecution "to be fully 
heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel, at his election. " 4 
In 1866, Massachusetts recognized by statute the competency of an 
accused to testify in his own behalf,5 but the custom of permitting the 
unsworn statement to the jury continued in the Commonwealth in 
capital cases.6 This right could be granted without regard to whether 
2 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§575, 579 (3d ed., Supp. 1970); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 
570, 573-574 (1961). 
s Id. at 585-586. 
4 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 16, 151 N.E. 74, 76(1926). 
5 NowcodifiedasG.L., c. 233,§20. 
6 Commonwealth v. Dasca1akis, 246 Mass. 12, 140 N.E. 470 (1923); Commonwealth v. 
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the accused exercised his privilege of testifying.7 In the instant case, 
however, the trial judge ruled against allowing DiMinico to make the 
unsworn statement, on the ground that he had had an opportunity to 
say whatever he wished under oath. In upholding this position, the 
Supreme Judicial Court found that the rationale underlying the un-
sworn statement had "entirely disappeared with the removal of the 
common law disqualification of a defendant in a criminal case to be a 
witness."8 Moreover, the Court noted that no jury findings could be 
properly based on the unsworn statement, and that all such findings 
had to be based on evidence and sworn testimony. In conclusion, there-
fore, the Court stated: "We are of the opinion that permitting an un-
sworn statement (now that any reason for it has disappeared) is not now 
required. "9 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in effect gives the trial judge 
the option to allow an unsworn statement. It is submitted that the 
practice should have been discarded entirely. In Ferguson v. Georgia, 
it was noted that Massachusetts is the only state retaining the unsworn 
statement practice.I0 Most other common law jurisdictions have dis-
continued it or have greatly diminished its significance.u Moreover, 
it is difficult to see how unsworn statements serve the accused in any 
legitimate manner. The testimony is of indeterminate weight, slight at 
best, and an ambiguous statement (or one prepared without experienced 
guidance) could be damaging to the accused. It is not even necessary 
for the trial judge to inform the defendant that he may make an un-
sworn statement,12 and the privilege will be considered waived by 
the defendant's silence.13 On the other hand, the unsworn statement 
may invite abuse and may confuse the jury. The practice clearly allows 
lying without cross-examination, and its potential effect on the jury, 
in situations where the defendant has already testified, was described 
thusly in O'Brien: "Obviously, if a defendant has himself testified, the 
jury may become confused between "his actual testimony, which is 
evidence subject to cross-examination, and his unsworn statement which 
is not evidence and not subject to cross-examination. " 14 It seems 
doubtful that jurors would be less confused when, after hearing the 
unsworn statement of a defendant who has previously testified, the 
jury is instructed that 
Burrough, 162 Mass. 513, 39 N.E. 184 (1895). In 1926, Chief Justice Rugg stated that the 
justification for continuing the practice was a humane regard for the defendant in view 
of the capital nature of the offense charged. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 151 
N.E. 74, (1926). 
7 Commonwealth v. McConnell, 162 Mass. 499,501-502,39 N.E. 107, 108 (1895). 
8 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh.ll81, 1187,271 N.E.2d633, 637. 
9 Idat 1188,271 N.E.2dat638. 
to 365 U.S. 570, 586n.l7 (1961). 
11 Id. at 582-587; see also Brief for the Commonwealth (as to DiMinico) at 5-6, Com-
monwealth v. O'Brien. 
12 Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 257 Mass. 1, 152 N.E. 745 (1926). 
ts Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246Mass.l2, 140 N.E. 470(1923). 
14 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh.ll81, 1188,271 N.E.2d633, 638. 
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this statement by the prisoner was not evidence, and . . . in con-
sidering the case [the jury] must differentiate between sworn testi-
mony and the statement not under oath; and . . . the statement 
[can] be regarded only as pointing out those matters which the de-
fendant wished to bring strongly to the attention of the jury; and 
. . . although not evidence, what he said could and ought to be 
considered as a statement of the defendant of what he claimed to 
be the facts in the case.15 
It is difficult to see any justification for the practice of allowing un-
sworn testimony in criminal trials. The practice has not been followed 
in the federal District Court for Massachusetts or the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals.I6 The legislature, it is hoped, will enact pending legisla-
tion17 that would amend G.L., c. 263, §5 to read as follows: 
A person accused of crime shall at his trial be allowed to be 
heard by counsel, to defend himself, to produce witnesses and 
proofs in his favor and to meet the witnesses produced against him 
face to face, but shall not at his trial be allowed to make an unsworn 
statement to the jury. [Emphasized provision would be added.] 
O'Brien's appeal. As one of his grounds for appeal, O'Brien alleged 
that inferences prejudicial to him arose from DiMinico's testimony. 
DiMinico had testified emphatically that Laughran was not involved 
in the crime, but had refused eight or nine times to answer any ques-
tions concerning O'Brien's involvement. At no time did O'Brien's 
counsel object to the questioning, seek to have the witness instructed 
to answer, or ask that cautionary instructions be given to the jury.18 
Following DiMinico's testimony, however, O'Brien's counsel moved 
for a mistrial on the ground that DiMinico's refusals denied O'Brien 
the right to confront a witness against him. The theory of the motion 
was apparently that the jury might infer from DiMinico's refusals 
to discuss O'Brien that O'Brien was in fact involved in the robbery. The 
trial judge refused to declare a mistrial, but in his charge to the jury he 
gave the following cautionary instructions: "The fact that DiMinico 
refused to tell who his companions were is not to lead you to an unfa-
vorable conclusion in respect of O'Brien. It is just a sheer negative .... 
It cannot be used against O'Brien. "19 
In upholding the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial, the 
Supreme Judicial Court did not make clear the basis for its decision. 
The opinion suggests that the Court relied upon the adequacy of the 
trial judge's cautionary instructions. Although the effectiveness of 
15 Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 14, 151 N.E. 74,75 (1926). 
16 See United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054 
(1970). 
17 House Bill3217. 
18 Because DiMinico refused to answer the questions concerning O'Brien, there 
would seem to have been no basis for cross-examination by O'Brien's counsel. For a 
similar dilemma, see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1925). 
19 Brieffor O'Brien at 18, Commonwealth v. O'Brien. 
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such instructions has been widely questioned, 20 the Court's reliance 
on them has ample Massachusetts precedent. 21 However, other lan-
guage in the opinion implies that O'Brien, through his counsel, might 
have waived his rights of confrontation by his silence at trial. The Court 
cited the inactivity of O'Brien's counsel during the questioning of 
DiMinico and noted that "O'Brien, perhaps relieved that no harmful 
information about him had been given, did not exercise his right to 
cross-examine."22 O'Brien's counsel may well have been lax in re-
maining silent during the repeated questioning that he later asserted 
to be objectionable. But in fact, a close reading of the record suggests 
that counsel may have remained silent in order to set up a basis for 
appeal. Nonetheless, under the circumstances, the Supreme Judicial 
Court's reliance on the trial judge's cautionary instructions seems 
questionable; at a minimum, the O'Brien decision should not stand for 
the proposition that there is no problem of prejudice if one defendant 
"simply refuse[s] to answer the prosecution's questions" about another 
defendant, nor should the decision be taken as an example of a waiver 
of constitutional rights by inaction. 
In Namet v. United States,23 the Supreme Court was presented with 
a claim very similar to that raised by O'Brien in the instant case. The 
petitioner in Namet asserted that at his trial the prosecutor had been 
permitted to ask two witnesses incriminating questions concerning 
alleged gambling violations involving the witnesses and the petitioner, 
although the prosecutor had full knowledge that the witnesses would 
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Stewart's opin-
ion for the majority noted two situations which lower federal courts 
had cited as possible grounds for reversible error: (1) where the prose-
cutor is guilty of misconduct in consciously attempting to build his 
case out of inferences arising from the refusal to testify, and (2) where 
inferences from a witness's refusal to testify unfairly prejudice a de-
fendant by adding critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form 
not subject to cross-examination.24 The majority opinion also cited 
three cases for the proposition that well-phrased jury ·instructions 
would cure any potentially prejudicial inferences arising from a wit-
ness's refusal to testify.25 In those three cases, however, the refusal to 
testify as to a relationship with the defendant were based on the wit-
20 See, e.g., the observation of Judge Learned Hand: "[I]t is doubtful whether such 
admonitions are not as likely to prejudice the interests of the accused as to help them, 
imposing as they do, upon the jury a task beyond their powers: i.e., a bit of 'mental gym-
nastics' ... which is for all practical purposes absurd to expect of them." United 
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 538 (2nd Cir. 1959). See also nn.28, 29 infra. 
21 Commonwealth v. Rucker, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1439, 1440-1441, 264 N.E.2d 656, 
657, and cases cited therein. 
22 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1181, 1186, 271 N.E.2d 633,637. 
"373 U.S.l79(1962). 
24 Id. at 186-187. 
25 The cases cited were United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2nd Cir. 1959); United 
States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1958); Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F.2d 330 
(9th Cir. 1950). 
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ness's privilege against self-incrimination, and any inferences that 
may have prejudiced the defendant would have been only a minor 
element in the prosecution's case. In any event, the Supreme Court in 
Namet upheld the petitioner's conviction without having to decide 
the more difficult questions concerning reversible error and prejudicial 
inferences. 26 
In O'Brien, the potential for prejudice was considerably greater than 
in the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Namet. First of all, DiMini-
co's refusal to answer questions concerning O'Brien was not based on 
the privilege against self-incrimination, for DiMinico had already 
admitted his participation in the robbery. Moreover, one of DiMinico's 
principal reasons for testifying was to clear Laughran of any involve-
ment in the crime, yet the trial judge allowed DiMinico to be asked re-
peatedly about O'Brien's involvement after it should have been clear 
that the witness did not intend to answer. All of the evidence in the 
case against O'Brien was circumstantial, and it could surely be argued 
that DiMinico's refusal to answer certain questions prejudiced O'Brien 
by adding critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject 
to cross-examination.27 It appears that there was no direct testimony 
by DiMinico concerning O'Brien, but even if there had been testimony 
subject to cross-examination, further questioning by O'Brien's counsel 
would only have invited further refusals to testify and a greater likeli-
hood of prejudice. Under the circumstances, the curative effect of an 
instruction to the jury would seem questionable. Two justices of the 
Supreme Court have spoken critically about such curative instructions: 
The government should not have the windfall of having the jury 
be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter 
of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of 
their minds.28 
The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction ... ,29 
As to the issue in O'Brien of a possible waiver of the right to confront 
witnesses, the Supreme Court's decisions in Fay v. Noia30 and Henry v. 
Mississippi31 should be noted. In the former case, the Court held that 
a denial of habeas corpus based on a failure to utilize available state 
procedures is impermissible unless it can be shown that the defendant 
himself clearly understood the procedures. Henry v. Mississippi ap-
plied Fay v. Noia to a situation involving a failure to enter timely ob-
26 "We need not pass upon the correctness of the several lower court decisions upon 
which the petitioner relies, for we think that even within the basic rationale of those 
cases reversible error was not committed in thiscase." 373 U.S. 179, 187-188 (1962). Jus-
tices Black and Douglas dissented. 
27 See textaccompanyingn.24supra. 
28 Della Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
29 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
30 372 u.s. 391 (1962). 
3! 379 u.s. 443 ( 1964). 
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jections to the introduction of certain evidence. Thus, if it could not be 
shown that O'Brien's counsel deliberately bypassed the available pro-
cedures for objecting to DiMinico's testimony, the defendant could 
still bring his constitutional claims before a federal court on a writ of 
habeas corpus. It might be found that the motion for a mistrial was 
sufficient notice of O'Brien's claim that the conduct of the trial denied 
him his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. 
The foregoing discussion is not intended to indicate that the Su-
preme Judicial Court was clearly incorrect in denying O'Brien's appeal, 
but rather to suggest that certain issues in the case were treated neither 
in sufficient detail nor with sufficient reference to the particular prob-
lems presented by DiMinico's conduct as a witness. 
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